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From Plyler v. Doe to Trayvon Martin:
Toward Closing the Open Society
Lyle Denniston*
Abstract
Lyle Denniston, the longest serving and most experienced
journalist covering the United States Supreme Court, takes his
theme of an inclusive and open society from the constitutional and
cultural vision of the late Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and then
offers a detailed argument that America is forfeiting—or at least
compromising—that vision in favor of a safer, more secure and
more cramped society, at home and abroad. The Article, taken
from a memorial lecture in Justice Powell’s honor at Washington
and Lee University in April 2012, draws upon a variety of very
different societal and legal developments that are found to have in
common the movement of people and ideas to the margins or even
out of sight. The analysis ranges from the treatment of individuals
captured by the American military during the perceived “war on
terrorism,” to the new xenophobic reaction to undocumented
immigrants, to the expanded militarization of the American
intelligence apparatus, to the narrowing of the supposedly open
digital culture, to the new cultural ghettoization of the whitedominated American suburb, to the still rampant exclusion and
discrimination against people of color and people of different
sexual identities. Against the possible perception that Denniston
has extolled only liberal or progressive values, he argues that
people of all ideologies have much to lose if American society
becomes further afraid of diversity, change, and openness.
It is a distinct privilege and a high honor to be invited to
deliver a lecture on your campus, in honor of Justice Powell—an
* The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Distinguished Lecture, presented April 5, 2012 at
the Washington and Lee University School of Law. Presently, Lyle Denniston is the
Supreme Court reporter for scotusblog.com, an online clearinghouse of information
about the Court.
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esteemed graduate of your university and your law school, a
Virginia gentleman capable of deep kindness and great tolerance,
and a most distinguished (if initially reluctant) member of the
Supreme Court of the United States, where he served for fifteen
years.1 It is rewarding to know that the university houses Justice
Powell’s papers,2 which well document a judicial career in which
he was a dominant figure, making majorities in an oftenfragmented Court, and standing courageously alone when he felt
the need to do so.
I am much indebted to your colleague and classmate, Parker
Kasmer, who has made it easy for me to be here, and I am
grateful to the students for their civic act in inaugurating the
Powell Lecture Series a decade ago.3 I know I am in good
company when I take this place.
My topic tonight is a sober one, but I would like to begin on a
more pleasant note: a story about Justice Powell that, in fact, I
heard from a student when I visited this campus some years ago.
A student who sat next to me at dinner said his father was a
friend of Justice Powell’s, and during a visit to Powell’s chambers,
was strongly urged to send his son to Washington and Lee. The
Justice was very enthusiastic about the college during that
conversation. After the discussion moved on to other topics and
then ended, the father left Powell's chambers. As he was walking
1. See Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist Justice, Dies at 90,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/26/us/lewis-powellcrucial-centrist-justice-dies-at-90.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Nov.
14, 2012) (describing Justice Powell’s life) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
2. See id. (“Throughout his life, he kept strong ties to Washington and Lee, to
which he gave his personal and Supreme Court papers, now housed in the Lewis F.
Powell Jr. Archives on the campus in Lexington.”); About the Powell Archives,
AND
LEE
UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL
OF
LAW,
WASHINGTON
http://law.wlu.edu/powellarchives/page.asp?pageid=245 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(“The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives comprises the Papers of Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
other manuscript collections held by the law library, the rare book collection, and
the archives of the School of Law.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
3. See About the Powell Lecture Series, WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.wlu.edu/powelllecture/page.asp?pageid=856 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (“In 2002, the students of Washington and Lee University School of
Law founded The Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Distinguished Lecture Series in honor of
former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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down the corridor, Powell came swiftly after him, caught up with
him, and again urged the father to make sure that the boy went
to W&L. This time, though, he offered an argument that he must
have felt would be most convincing: he ticked off the names of
women’s colleges and the exact number of miles each was from
Lexington. The lad did not tell me whether that was the clincher.
May I turn, then, to my subject and start with an opinion
written by Justice Powell almost exactly thirty years ago. It was
a separate opinion in the case of Plyler v. Doe.4 The case had a
secondary title, and it is far more descriptive: Texas v. Certain
Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children.5
Justice Powell’s opinion6 speaks of an open society7 that, to
my mind, no longer exists in this country for undocumented
immigrants. You will know my sensitivity on this subject when I
tell you that, as I write stories today about it, I refuse to describe
such human beings as “aliens.”
Still, the actual or threatened closing of an open society goes
well beyond the fate of those who live in America without legal
permission to be here. The trend is, for me, apparent in a variety
of current policies and legal developments, perhaps very different
from each other in fundamental ways but, in combination,
moving people or ideas beyond the pale or, indeed, out of sight.
We find it much easier to define something of which we are
ignorant, or something that stirs fear in us, as necessarily to be
excluded from our circle of acceptance.
Part of it has to do with the creation of pariah classes,
pushed into the category of The Other.8 Another part of it has to
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
5. See id. (noting the secondary title).
6. See id. at 236–41 (Powell, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., id. at 237 (“The classification in question severely disadvantages
children who are the victims of a combination of circumstances. Access from Mexico
to this country across our 2,000-mile border, is readily available and virtually
uncontrollable. Illegal aliens are attracted by our employment opportunities, and
perhaps by other benefits as well.”); id. at 238 (“The classification at issue deprives
a group of children of the opportunity for education afforded all other children
simply because they have been assigned a legal status due to a violation of law by
their parents.”).
8. See generally ADRIAAN PEPERZAK, TO THE OTHER: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS (1993), available at http://docs.lib.
purdue.edu/purduepress_ebooks/20/ (discussing the philosophical concept of The
Other, a concept first developed by French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas).
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do with the refusal to confront—openly and candidly—very deep
wrongs. And part of it has to do with intentionally clogging or
closing the channels of public discourse.
The phenomenon extends to the creation of a military
garrison with wired enclosures at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, in
order to detain—perhaps for the remainder of their lives for some
of them—a class of people we want nowhere near our shores and
are unwilling to bring before our courts so that their fate might
be decided justly.9
And it reaches to a fearsome prison outside of Kabul,
Afghanistan, where we have chosen to place another group of
people detained as terrorist suspects, precisely to put them
beyond the reach of our nation’s courts of law.10
Further, it reaches the impenetrable wall of secrecy that
surrounds a national policy that is, slowly but perceptibly,
turning the entire American intelligence apparatus into a lethal
military machine that does not even exempt United States
citizens from its retribution.11
9. See Lyle Denniston, Court Bypasses All New Detainee Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 11, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/
court-bypasses-all-new-detainee-cases/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that the
Supreme Court “turned down seven separate appeals by Guantanamo Bay
prisoners,” indicating “that it is not now inclined to further second-guess the
government’s detention policy”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit: Last Stop for Detainees?, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9,
2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/d-c-circuit-last-stop-fordetainees/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that although “the detainees very
often win in District Court . . . not one has ever gotten released from confinement
by court order” because “the government has never lost any of its appeals in the
D.C. Circuit Court”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See Lyle Denniston, U.S.: No Habeas Rights at Bagram, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 15, 2009, 4:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/09/u-s-no-habeas-rightsat-bagram (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the argument made by the
United States that Bagram detainees were not entitled to habeas rights and noting
District Judge John D. Bates’s “suggestion that the U.S. military may be using the
Bagram prison site as a way to put detainees beyond the reach of American civilian
courts”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (failing to
reach “the merits of the alleged authorization of the targeted killing of a U.S.
citizen oversees” because “questions of justiciability require[d] dismissal of [the]
case at the outset”); Lyle Denniston, New Challenge to Drone Killings,
SCOTUSBLOG (July 18, 2012, 3:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/ newchallenge-to-drone-killings/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing a lawsuit
initiated by two civil rights groups “seeking to hold top government officials to
blame legally for killing three U.S. citizens in attacks from the air in Yemen”) (on
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Some of those developments may be known to you.
But there is more, much more, in areas of our culture where
free exploration had seemed the norm. There is the determined
effort—stalled for the time being by a true internet uprising—to
put severe new restraints on the openness of digital culture.12 The
Supreme Court has recently declared that there is no guarantee
that a public domain in literature and music has any
constitutional claim to remain open when the juggernaut of
Hollywood-driven copyright bears down upon it.13
And there is the steady march of intolerance against people
because of the color of their skin or the nature of their sexual
identity. We have come to the place, it seems, where a black
teenager can be slain in the street by a neighborhood sentinel,14
and we are left to debate not the inexplicable reason for such an
act, but whether it was legally justified by a barrel-chested law
that tells one to “stand his or her ground.”15 And we have come to
the place, it is obvious, where three distinguished judges of a
state supreme court can be denied reelection solely because they
interpreted an equality guarantee in their state’s constitution to
allow for same-sex marriage.16
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) (expanding law
enforcement’s ability to combat online copyright infringement); Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property (Protect
I.P.) Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (same); see also Jonathan Weisman, In Fight
Over Piracy Bills, New Economy Rises Against Old, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/technology/web-protests-piracy-bill-and-2-keysenators-change-course.html?hp=&pagewanted= all (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(describing the internet’s strong opposition to the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act
and Protect I.P. Act and the subsequent withdrawal of congressional support for
the bills) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
13. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (determining that a statute
allowing works to be removed from the public domain “does not transgress
constitutional limitations on Congress’ authority”).
14. See Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN
(last updated May 23, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/
justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(outlining the events surrounding Trayvon Martin’s death) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2012) (“A person who is not engaged in an
unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a
right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and
meet force with force . . . .”).
16. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009) (holding that the
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In the face of such unsettling times, let me start over again
with Lewis Powell and those “Undocumented Alien Children”17 in
Texas.
The Texas legislature had passed a law barring local school
districts from using any state funds to finance the education of
children who were not legal residents of this country and denying
such children even entry into the public schools.18 By a vote of
five to four, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court found that
statute to be a violation of the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment.19
Justice Powell wrote separately,20 even while joining the
majority opinion written by Justice Brennan.21 Recalling that the
Court had previously made clear that children are not to be
condemned for the misdeeds of their parents,22 Justice Powell
wrote:
The classification at issue deprives a group of children of the
opportunity for education afforded all other children simply
because they have been assigned a legal status due to a
violation of law by their parents. These children thus have
been singled out for a lifelong penalty and stigma. A legislative
classification that threatens the creation of an underclass of
Iowa marriage statute limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman
“violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution”); see also Grant
Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010, 4:26 AM),
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/ Iowansdismiss-three-justices?gcheck=1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (discussing the election
results) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (containing a secondary title that
refers to the appellees as “Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien
Children”).
18. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (West 1981) (withholding state funding
for the education of children not legally admitted into the country and allowing
school districts to refuse to enroll such children), invalidated by Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982).
19. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. (striking down the Texas statute because it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
20. See id. at 237–41 (Powell, J., concurring).
21. See id. at 205–30 (majority opinion).
22. See id. at 238 (Powell, J., concurring) (“‘[V]isiting . . . condemnation on the
head of an infant’ for the misdeeds of the parents is illogical, unjust, and ‘contrary
to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.’” (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))).
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future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of
the fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.23

Those words are phrased as law, but they are infused with a
sense of the decency that was so much a part of the work of Lewis
Powell. There is in those phrases not the remotest hint of
intolerance. He laments the failure of the federal government to
police the border, but he refuses to make the children pay for that
governmental lapse.24
Viewed from today’s perspective, Lewis Powell’s vision of an
inclusive society, one generous in its acceptance of people who
look and are different from the majority, seems somewhat dated,
somewhat unreal, perhaps somewhat naive.
Move forward from Plyler v. Doe, leap across thirty years,
and one encounters a seemingly different world. One encounters,
for example, a state law like Alabama’s House Bill 56.25 One of
the provisions of that new state law turns public school officials
into immigration enforcers, requiring all public schools in the
state to determine if each child entering any grade was born
outside the United States or is a child of an illegal alien parent.26
Because of Plyler v. Doe, they cannot be barred from school,27 but
the information gathered about them can provide the basis for

23. Id. at 238–39.
24. See id. at 240–41 (“So long as the ease of entry remains inviting, and the
power to deport is exercised infrequently by the Federal Government, the
additional expense of admitting these children to public schools might fairly be
shared by the Federal and State governments.”).
25. See ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to -30 (2012) (attempting to fight illegal
immigration in Alabama by maximizing enforcement of federal laws and
cooperation with federal authorities), partially invalidated by United States v.
Alabama, Nos. 11-14532, 11-14674, 2012 WL 3553503 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2012)
(finding that federal law preempted some provisions of House Bill 56).
26. See id. § 31-13-27(a)(1) (“Every public . . . school in this state, at the time
of enrollment . . . shall determine whether the student enrolling . . . was born
outside the jurisdiction of the United States or is the child of an alien not lawfully
present in the United States . . . .”), invalidated by Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v.
Governor of Ala., Nos. 11-14535, 11-14675, 2012 WL 3553613 (11th Cir. Aug. 20,
2012) (finding the provision in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
27. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (determining that Texas cannot
“deny a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers to
other children residing within its borders” without showing that the denial would
further a substantial state interest and finding that Texas did not make the
necessary showing).
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their, or at least their parents’, deportation in what would surely
be a crisis for many families.
Then cross over into Louisiana. Officials of that state
recently asked the Supreme Court of the United States to forbid
the federal government from counting any undocumented
immigrants living anywhere in the United States, and to order
the government to recalculate the 2010 Census without them.28 It
was an undisguised effort to declare such people outside of the
American political community because the Census data is used to
calculate the distribution of seats in the United States House of
Representatives.29 It is a fact that, since the first census in 1790,
all such undocumented people have been counted.30
The Court did turn down that request, without comment, in
March 2012,31 but that did not take away the message that
Louisiana’s legal maneuver sent, and, indeed, it does not prevent
Louisiana from beginning its challenge anew in a lower court.
In addition, in April 2012, the Supreme Court held a hearing
on Senate Bill 1070,32 the Arizona law seeking to control the lives
28. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Complaint, Complaint, and Brief
in Support of Motion, Louisiana v. Bryson, 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012) (No. 22O140
ORG), denied by 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012), available at http://
www.ag.state.la.us/Shared/ViewDoc.aspx? Type=3&Doc=312 (seeking to exclude
illegal immigrants from the population data used to apportion seats in the House of
Representatives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See Lyle Denniston, New Dispute Over Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
15, 2011, 12:10 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/11/new-dispute-overimmigrants/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the motivation behind the
complaint that Louisiana sought to file) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
30. See Campbell J. Gibson & Emily Lennon, Historical Census Statistics on
the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850–1990 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census Population Div., Working Paper No. 29, 1999), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html
(stating that although “[t]he first decennial census of the U.S. population was
taken in 1790 . . . in order to obtain the population counts needed for Congressional
apportionment . . . [a] question on place of birth, which is the source of data on the
foreign-born population, was not added until the 1850 census” (citation omitted))
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See Orders in Pending Cases, Louisiana v. Bryson, 132 S. Ct. 1781 (2012)
(No.
22O140
ORG),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders
/031912zor.pdf (“Motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied.”).
32. See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 2010
Ariz. Sess. Laws 113 (seeking to deter illegal immigration in Arizona), partially
invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (considering
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of undocumented immigrants living in that state—controls that
are potentially so onerous that they could only be expected to
drive many of those people out of the state altogether, and that is
precisely its goal.33
In a nation where, by the year 2050, according to the Census
Bureau, 54% of the total population will be made up of
minorities,34 these gestures among the states appear to be
remarkable efforts to stand against history. And driven as they
often are by claims of rampant crime by such immigrants,35 they
add to a pervasive complex of fear.
It is that very fear that took the life of seventeen-year-old
Trayvon Benjamin Martin on a pleasant street—Retreat View
Circle in Sanford, Florida—on February 26.36 The story we know
so far is that a neighborhood watch volunteer in a gated
community, George Zimmerman, felt the need to pursue that
young black man wearing a hooded sweatshirt.37 Zimmerman was
diligent about it; he apparently kept up the pursuit even though a
whether “federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the
[Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act]”); Julia Preston,
Justices to Rule on Role of the States in Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/states-await-supreme-court-hearing-onarizona-immigration-law.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(describing the issues on which the Supreme Court hearing would focus) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. See 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113, § 1 (“The provisions of this act are intended
to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens
and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”).
34. See Minorities Expected to Be Majority in 2050, CNN (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-08-13/us/census.minorities_1_hispanic-populationcensus-bureau-white-population?_s=PM:US (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (noting the
changing make-up of the American population) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
35. See Alex Nowrasteh, The Arizona Law Fights Phantom Problems, U.S.
NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-arizonas-sb-1070immigration-law-constitutional/the-arizona-law-fights-phantom-problems
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (noting that Arizona used the “so-called ‘illegal immigrant
crime wave’” to justify its law) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
36. See Lane DeGregory, Trayvon Martin’s Killing Shatters Safety Within
Retreat at Twin Lakes in Sanford, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Mar. 25, 2012,
http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/article1221799.ece (last visited
Nov. 14, 2012) (describing the community in which George Zimmerman pursued
and shot Martin) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. See Botelho, supra note 14 (describing what happened on the night Martin
was killed).
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police dispatcher told him when he called in, “OK. We don’t need
you to do that.”38
There apparently was a scuffle between the two, and, in a
moment, the youth lay in the grass, bleeding to death from a
gunshot wound.39
Whatever we may assume about racial tension and its
possible role in this tragic incident, we do know that it occurred
in a community that wanted to be insulated from the threats that
lay beyond its gate and its fences.40 That subdivision’s very name,
the Retreat at Twin Lakes, tells of a desire to be left alone.
But if we are to believe the findings in a new book by Rich
Benjamin, such gated communities are creating a new cultural
reality in America,41 and it is one in which the incident in
Sanford may have been predictable.
Benjamin is a black author whose book is titled Searching for
Whitopia: An Improbable Journey to the Heart of White
America.42 He spent two years traveling to see what life would be
like in predominantly white, gated communities across the
country.43
The book, I suspect, will take its place in the annals of
America’s cultural studies alongside such classics as Robert and
Helen Lynd’s Middletown,44 their social science reflections on
Muncie, Indiana; Thornton Wilder’s play Our Town,45 about the
fictional village of Grover’s Corners, New Hampshire, and
Sinclair Lewis’s satirical novel, Babbitt,46 about a businessman
busily climbing the social ladder in the fictional town of Zenith,
somewhere in the Midwest.
38. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See id. (stating that police “found Martin ‘face down in the grass’”).
40. See DeGregory, supra note 36 (describing the community as a place where
“[e]verything was walled in, to keep out the unknown”).
41. See generally RICH BENJAMIN, SEARCHING FOR WHITOPIA: AN IMPROBABLE
JOURNEY TO THE HEART OF WHITE AMERICA (2009) (discussing the growth of
predominantly white communities, which Benjamin calls “whitopias,” throughout
the United States).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 8 (stating that he “lived in three such communities”).
44. ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE (1929).
45. THORNTON WILDER, OUR TOWN (Harper & Row 1957) (1938).
46. SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT (Library of America 1992) (1922).
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Rich Benjamin’s judgment about a typical gated community
is harsh.47 As he described his findings in The New York Times in
March 2012, he said such a community is “self-contained,
conservative and overzealous in its demands for ‘safety.’”48 “Gated
communities,” he said, “churn a vicious cycle by attracting likeminded residents who seek shelter from outsiders and whose
physical seclusion then worsens paranoid groupthink against
outsiders.”49 They have, he said, “a bunker mentality.”50
If Benjamin is right, the presence of a hooded black teenager
on a residential street at nighttime would be the personification
of The Other,51 a disturber of domestic tranquility. And in the
context of my remarks here, what happened to Trayvon Martin
may be yet another example of the closing down of an open
society.
The phenomenon does not stop there.
Reflect, for a moment, on the “bunker mentality”52 that has
developed as America confronted global terrorism in the wake of
the attacks of September 11, 2001. Former Vice President
Cheney’s “one percent doctrine” exhibited that attitude: if there is
a one percent chance that an act of terrorism will occur, it will
occur, and preparation must be made to head it off at all cost.53
We have 166 individuals still housed in the military prison at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and many of them have been cleared for
release, but they have nowhere to go.54 The Congress of the
47. See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 41 (criticizing “whitopias,” which are
becoming increasingly common in the United States).
48. Rich Benjamin, The Gated Community Mentality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/30/opinion/the-gated-communitymentality.html ?r=2 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally PEPERZAK, supra note 8.
52. See Benjamin, supra note 48 (discussing the “bunker mentality”).
53. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S
PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 62 (2006) (analyzing former Vice President
Cheney’s view that “‘[i]f there’s a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are
helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as certainty
in terms of our response’”).
54. See Huma Khan, Protests Mark Guantanamo Bay Detainee Center’s 10th
Anniversary, ABC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://abcnews.
go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/protests-mark-guantanamo-bay-detainee-centers-
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United States has decreed that they cannot be brought to this
country.55 In effect, the lawmakers have declared that the
entirety of America is a gated community that these people dare
not enter. Congress also has mandated that, if a Guantanamo
prisoner should be sent to any other country, his or her life
thereafter must be controlled by conditions that no self-respecting
sovereign nation would agree to accept within its own borders.56
Hence, many simply stay at Guantanamo.
Four years ago, the Supreme Court declared that those at
Guantanamo had a constitutional right to go to an American
court to challenge their continued confinement, and a chance to
obtain actual release.57 But the federal appeals court in
Washington, D.C., in a string of decisions,58 has hollowed out that
10th-anniversary/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (“Today, 171 detainees remain in the
detention center, some of them deemed too dangerous to release and others with
nowhere to go.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Since then,
four prisoners have been released or transferred, and one detainee has died. See
Rod Nickel, Guantanamo’s Last Western Detainee Returned to Canada, REUTERS
(Sept. 29, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/ 29/usguantanamo-khadr-idUSBRE88S0AN20120929 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating
that 166 detainees now remain at Guantanamo) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
55. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011,
Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4137, 4351 (prohibiting the use of
appropriated funds for the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees into the
United States); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1),
119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006) (“[N]o court, justice,
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . . .”) amended by Military Commissions Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635–36, invalidated by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
56. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1022, 125 Stat. 1298 (requiring al Qaeda detainees captured in the course
of hostilities to be kept in military custody).
57. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (finding that
Guantanamo detainees have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus).
58. See, e.g., Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating
the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and
remanding the case for further consideration); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 2
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d
400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (reversing the grant of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition
for writ of habeas corpus and ordering the petition to be denied on remand), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 869 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (affirming the denial of a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for writ of habeas
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legal remedy to the point where a judge on that court has said
publicly that he does not believe any of his colleagues would
uphold any federal judge’s order to release anyone from
Guantanamo if there is even the slightest chance that they are, in
fact, inclined toward terrorism59—when terrorism is defined so
loosely that no one can know precisely what it means.
And it is not even clear that habeas corpus, an increasingly
limited legal option open to those held at Guantanamo Bay, is
available for hundreds of other prisoners held by the United
States military at a prison in Afghanistan.60 Those prisoners’
fates may be determined entirely by the Afghan government now
that control of that prison has been handed over to local
authorities.61
Certainly, the government faces fierce and awesomely
complicated challenges on what to do about terrorism, but surely
we do not need to send the Constitution into wartime exile as
part of that response.
We seem also to have put the Constitution’s core concept of
checks and balances on hold as we seek to know how the
government is actually waging a “war on terrorism.”
A doctrine of “state secrets” that began in 1950 as a limited
means of excluding specific items of evidence bearing on national
security from being explored in court cases62 has now
mushroomed into a doctrine that shuts down judicial inquiry
altogether, merely upon a classified declaration by a government

corpus), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
59. See Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (“I doubt any of my colleagues will vote to grant a petition if he or she
believes that it is somewhat likely that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an
active supporter.”).
60. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding “that
the jurisdiction of the courts to afford the right to habeas relief and the protection
of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens held in Executive detention in
the Bagram detention facility in the Afghan theater of war”).
61. See Rod Nordland, Issues Linger as Afghans Take Control of a Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/world/asia/ parwanprison-at-bagram-transferred-to-afghans-at-least-formally.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2012) (describing the transfer of Bagram prison to Afghan authorities) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1953) (discussing the
judicially-created state secrets privilege).
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security official.63 And those who have had a peek at the reasons
claimed for such invocations of national security, while not
revealing what they had learned, have said that the claims of
national security are frequently exaggerated and often are based
on no more than unfiltered raw intelligence of an extremely
dubious kind.64
There is a world of difference, of course, between an open
society and a national security state, but one must ask whether
there is no middle ground. Is there no way by which the Judiciary
can inquire into the use of torture as a means of intelligence
gathering? Is there no means by which the Judiciary can examine
the policy of targeted killing even of United States citizens abroad
who are deemed to be terrorist threats? And is there nowhere
within the structure of government where the secret world of a
thoroughly militarized Central Intelligence Agency can be
meaningfully examined?
Put another way, an abiding question for Americans living in
this frightened age is whether accountability has become an
unaffordable luxury, whether a faith in democratic principle is
naively out of date.
Are there other threats to the open society that we thought
we had? Of course there are, and they have nothing to do with
national security.
America has never had an opportunity for openness to match
what came with the arrival of the Digital Age. We know so much
more about each other, including, perhaps, some things we would
just as soon not know. But leaving that aside, has any one of you
in this audience never marveled about what could be reached
with a click or two of a mouse? What a universe of ideas and
63. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (“[W]e hold that the government’s valid assertion of the state
secrets privilege warrants dismissal of the litigation . . . .”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
2442 (2011).
64. See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Report at issue here was produced in the fog of war by a
clandestine method that we know almost nothing about. It is not familiar,
transparent, generally understood as reliable, or accessible; nor is it mundane,
quotidian data entry akin to state court dockets or tax receipts.”); see also Thomas
I. Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 78,
80 (1982) (stating that “[s]ubsequent events almost always demonstrate that the
asserted dangers to national security have been grossly exaggerated”).
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experiences is out there, and so very much of it is available free—
free of cost, free of predigestion, free of censorship, free of bias,
free of lunacy. The selection of what to examine and to absorb or
reject is solely by unmediated private choice.
And I am not talking about the number of apps that you have
on your phone that enable you to live your daily life so much more
conveniently. I would imagine you have seen that television
commercial in which one person has a great idea about
something, only to be told by another person that it has already
happened so many seconds ago. It almost seems that we have
created apps that allow time to run backwards!
But the digital world is not as open as you might think, and
there are very real signs that it may lose more of its openness.
From early on in this age, we have learned that electronic
exploration and the concept of copyright were on a collision
course or at least were in considerable tension. You may
remember the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.65 episode, in which the Supreme Court informed us that the
free trade in creative expression was not really very free after
all.66 We have heard a lot since then about piracy.
That was nothing, though, in comparison to the restraints on
digital communication that proposed new federal legislation
would bring about. The so-called Stop Online Piracy Act,67 and
variations of it, appeared to be absolutely draconian to major
players in the digital community.68 And just when it seemed
that the major entertainment and recording companies had
Congress in their control on this issue, the Internet rose up in
angry protest in January and drove that legislation off of the

65. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
66. See id. at 919 (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”).
67. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
68. See Julianne Pepitone, Tech Giants Say SOPA Piracy Bill Is ‘Draconian,’
CNN MONEY (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/11/16/
technology/sopa/index.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (stating that the Stop Online
Piracy Act “sparked a giant backlash from big tech companies, including Google
and Facebook,” who viewed it as “far too strict and rife with unintended
consequences”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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calendars in both the House and Senate.69 So much for a passive
citizenry. But, we are told, the antipiracy movement is far from
dead; it is just lying in wait for another opportunity.70
One very unsettling facet about that entire incident is that
among the loudest cheerleaders for the legislation was none
other than the nation’s most fervent defender of First
Amendment freedoms, renowned New York attorney Floyd
Abrams.71
One can be reasonably certain, I would suggest, that if the
Stop Online Piracy Act or some version of it does emerge from
Congress, its validity will be upheld by the Supreme Court—as
long as the Court’s current prevailing view of copyright holds.
While the Constitution speaks of copyright as protected only
for “limited times,”72 the Court in the Eldred v. Ashcroft73
decision in 2003 upheld the concept that limited does not really
mean very limited.74 That decision validated the Hollywoodinitiated Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act75 that

69. See Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012)
(explaining Congress’s support of the bills before the protests and describing the
withdrawal of congressional support in response to the protests) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See Melissa Bell, Laws Alone Won’t Put a Lid on Piracy, WASH. POST, Jan.
27, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/online-piracy-hasnt-goneaway/2012/01/25/gIQAMEsnVQ_story.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012) (discussing
the ongoing problem of piracy after SOPA and the continuing need for a solution)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See Letter from Floyd Abrams, Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP, to
Chairman Lamar Smith & Ranking Member John Conyers of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary 13 (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.mpaa.org/Re sources/1227ef12-e2094edf-b8b8-bb4af768430c.pdf (“This proposed legislation is not inconsistent with the
First Amendment; it would protect creators of speech, as Congress has done since
this Nation was founded, by combating its theft.”).
72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . .”
(emphasis added)).
73. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
74. See id. at 204 (allowing Congress to extend the duration of existing
copyrights).
75. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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extended existing copyright protection on many creative works
for very long additional periods.76
And Eldred, it seems, did not reach the outermost expansion
of copyright. Just this past January, in the decision in Golan v.
Holder,77 the Supreme Court essentially destroyed—at least in
constitutional terms—the concept of a “public domain.”78
For at least the past thirty years, scholars have been
developing the notion that, when a once-copyrighted work
reaches the end of that monopoly protection, it enters into a
“public domain” that has its own claim to constitutional
protection, under the First Amendment.79 Works that had never
been put under copyright in the United States were already in
the “public domain” and, so it was argued, could not be
withdrawn into a copyrighted status.80
The Golan decision explicitly rejected that idea as a
constitutionally grounded principle.81 Those who have been using
for their own purposes a literary or musical work that has been in
the public domain do not thereby acquire First Amendment
protection against having such a work newly copyrighted, the
Court said.82
No one, the Court declared, obtains any personal right under
the Constitution to copy or perform a work just because it has
76. See id. (extending copyright terms in the United States by twenty years).
77. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
78. See id. at 878 (“Neither the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First
Amendment, we hold, makes the public domain, in any and all cases, a territory
that works may never exit.”).
79. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354,
360–64 (1999) (explaining the public domain); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 970–77 (1990) (same).
80. See, e.g., Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of the Public Domain, 28
U. DAYTON L. REV. 215, 259 (2002) (“[T]he defining characteristic of the public
domain in intellectual property is that any individual is free to use the material as
he or she sees fit; and once matter enters the public domain, the government
cannot alienate that ‘property’ by removing it from the public domain.”) (citations
omitted).
81. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–91 (explaining why a statute granting
copyright protection to works already in the public domain did not violate the First
Amendment).
82. See id. (finding that “nothing in the historical record, congressional
practice, or [the Court’s] own jurisprudence warrants exceptional First Amendment
solicitude for copyrighted works that were once in the public domain”).
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come out from under earlier copyright protection or has never
been copyrighted in the United States, so no one can object if
copyright is later conferred.83 Any legal rights that exist belong
only to the author or composer, it added.84
And to add to the indignity of this insult to the public
domain, the Court’s opinion disposed of the claim of
constitutional significance for a public domain in a footnote—
Footnote 26.85
The greatest casualty of the Golan and Eldred decisions, of
course, is the global digital library that has been developing in
recent years, and has been profoundly dependent upon the
existence of a viable public domain.
The risk to an open society of creative expression is now
beyond dispute, even granting that some measure of copyright
protection does contribute to the creative urge in artists, writers,
and composers. How long, we may ask, must it exist before it
stifles further creative expression that is derived from an
original work?
I would like to turn then to a final—and probably more
controversial—threat to an open society. I refer, of course, to the
effort, pursued in so many sectors of our public policy and our civic
discourse, to exclude gays and lesbians from an equal role in society
and its institutions—especially in those central institutions in
mainstream culture, marriage86 and the military.87
83. See id. at 892 (“Anyone has free access to the public domain, but no one,
after the copyright term has expired, acquires ownership rights in the onceprotected works.”).
84. See id. (“Rights typically vest at the outset of copyright protection, in an
author or rightholder.” (citation omitted)).
85. Id. at 888 n.26 (disagreeing with the dissent’s suggestion “that at least
where copyright legislation extends protection to works previously in the public
domain, Congress must counterbalance that restriction with new incentives to
create”).
86. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419,
2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
87. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell), Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73 (1993) (codified at
10 U.S.C. § 674) (codifying in federal statute the existing practice of prohibiting
gays and lesbians from serving in the military), repealed by Don’t Ask Don’t Tell
Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515.
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And this, of course, gives me an opportunity to return to
Lewis Powell and his approach to life and the law.
The gay rights issue, overall, is among the most agonizing
public questions confronting America, and Lewis Powell’s own
struggle with it was itself agonizing, as is so painfully examined
in John Jeffries’s great biography of the Justice.88 Jeffries’s
ultimate conclusion is that, “[o]n this issue, Powell never found
the middle ground.”89
Jeffries’s chapter on Bowers v. Hardwick,90 the 1986
decision refusing to recognize constitutional equality for sexual
intimacy for homosexuals, spells out in detail Justice Powell’s
role in that case, switching sides but ultimately voting with the
majority.91 In a real sense, Powell even then recognized the
long-range constitutional implications of the controversy—the
effect that could be expected on marriage and the military.92
And he fretted deeply about that.93
Although he would say, four years later, that he had made a
mistake in Bowers, and that the dissenters there “had the better
of the arguments,”94 it is far from clear that his mind and heart
were ever settled on the ultimate question of gay equality. He
died five years before Bowers was explicitly overruled in
Lawrence v. Texas,95 which, of course, set the constitutional stage
for challenges to the exclusion of gays both from the military and
from the civil institution of marriage.
America is probably more open politically to homosexual
equality than it was in Lewis Powell’s day, and that ultimately
88. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 511–30 (1994)
(describing Justice Powell’s struggle with the gay rights issue).
89. Id. at 530.
90. See id. at 511–30; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)
(finding a Georgia law criminalizing consensual homosexual sodomy
constitutional), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
91. See JEFFRIES, supra note 88, at 513–30 (discussing Justice Powell’s role in
the Bowers decision, including his indecisiveness and changes of mind).
92. See id. at 518 (describing Powell’s anticipation of the effect that Bowers
would have on marriage and the military).
93. See id. (acknowledging Powell’s concerns over the implications of Bowers).
94. Id. at 530.
95. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers v. Hardwick
should be and now is overruled.”); Greenhouse, supra note 1 (announcing Justice
Powell’s death in 1998).
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may make a constitutional difference. The resolution of the issue,
though, could certainly use—as part of the discussion—the sense
of decency and humility that was so much a part of Justice
Powell’s life.
When one delivers a memorial lecture like this one, in honor
of a person no longer with us, there may be a strong temptation
to enlist that celebrated person as an ally on one side or the other
of contemporary controversy. One might ask a variation of that
popular question of today: What would Lewis Powell say? And
one might pretend to know the answer.
I have no idea how he would have reacted to each or any of
the specific examples I have put forth here, or on the general
question of what I see as the accelerating trend toward closing an
open society. I have to believe he would have counseled caution
and prudence, the exercise of measured judgment, and the
patience to hear what the other side might have to say.
Lewis Powell was a conservative, as a man and as a Justice,
but I do not mean by that to place him in a static category along a
fixed ideological spectrum. His conservatism seemed to me
always to bespeak his belief that even society’s most intractable
problems could be resolved if calm judgment were brought to bear
in a spirit of mutual respect and accommodation.
Many of the views that I have stated here today are, I
recognize, at least tinged with values that most would recognize—
in today’s political parlance—as liberal in nature. I would feel that I
had failed if they were received here only in that way.
The openness of American society is not a liberal or a
conservative cause; it is the essence of a society unafraid of change
or of diversity, the character of a society that appreciates that time
does not stand still and that civic reform is never fully done.
And it is a society that looks forward to each new journey
along an open road, remembering the advice that John Milton
gave to Parliament nearly four centuries ago: “[H]e who thinks
we are to pitch our tent here, and have attain[e]d the utmost
prospect of reformation, . . . that man by this very opinion
declares that he is yet far[] short of [t]ruth.”96
Thank you.
96.
1904).
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